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IN THE

~SUPREME

COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
ROLAND LAV AR DENISON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

ALVIN D. CHAPMAN, CONTINENTAL
OIL C01iPANY, a corporHtion, and
DORA HAR'TLEY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Civil
No. 8554

RESPONDENTS' ALVIN D. CHAPMAN AND
CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF F·ACTS
We cannot aecept the st:atement of facts as set forth
in the appellant's brief. While we recognize that in a
case where a verdict has been directed in fHvor of the
respondents, the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom must be viewed in the light most f.a;vorable to
the appellant, we believe that counsel for the appellant
has overlooked the equally familiar principle that the
testimony of a witness can be no stronger than it is left
on cross-examination. In the instant suit, there is very
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little conflict in the evidence. All of the witnesses were
called by the pJaintiff, and there is no substantial dispute in their testimony. The f·acts relevant to the issue's
of this ap,pe,al may be briefly stated as follows:
On the evening of the accident, the defendant Dora
Hartley was enroute to a n1eeting in Orem (T. 63). She
entered U.S. I-Iighway 91 from the east side thereof, at
the point where it is intersected by what is known as the
C'arterville Road (T. 63). Prior to entering the highway, Mrs. Hartley stopped in response to a stop sign,
and observed for traffic approaching from the left or
south (T. 64). She observed the Continental Oil truck
approaching at a distance about two blocks away (T. 65).
She entered the highway .and proceeded northerly along
the extreme easterly edge of the highway (T. 66). She
was not certain whether she was entirely in the right
hand lane of the highway, or partially in the right hand
lane and partially on the right shoulder (T. 68, 73, 74).
The street "'\\ras covered with ice, and the lines marking
the lanes of traffic were not vi~ible (T. 68). The rear
wheels of her car 'vere equipped with Enow tires, and it
was in good 1neehanical c.ondition (T. 66). She proceeded very slo,vly up the hill, at a rate of speed estirnated by her at appToximately 15 n1iles per hour (T. 67).
She had h:ad previous experience in driving this hill
under wintry conditions; and she 'vas eognizant of the
perils involved (T. 67). She had her car co1npletely
under eontrol ( T. 68). .At about the tirne the oil truck
reached her (in the left l1and lane for north bound
traffic.), she suddenly (•'quirk as a flash") lost eontrol
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of her car, and it spun in a counter-clockwise direction
("spun sideways out into the lane of traffic") (T. 70, 71).
It made only about a quarter of a turn when it eame
forcibly into collision with something els.e, and then spun
rlockwise, finally coming to rest on the right hand, or
east shoulder of the highway, and facing in a southerly
direction (T. 71). None of the foregoing testimony is
disputed by any other 'vitness.
The defendant Chap1nan, operator of the oil truck,
testified that he had stopped for the semaphore light at
the botton1 of the Orem hill (T. 90). When the light
changed to green in his favor, he st~arted up the· hill in the
extreme right hand lane. He observe·d the Hartley car in
the lane ahead of him, (':r. 86), and as he appro:ached it,
he swung out ]nto the center lane to pass (T. 91). She
did not appear to he having any difficulty, nor did her
ear appear to be out of control ( T. 87, 90). As he was
about to pass her car, it suddenly went out of control,
.and slipped or skidded into the pathway of his truck,
coming into collision therewith, and causing him to lose
control (T. 91, 93, 94). Notwithstanding Chapman's
efforts to hold the truck on the right side of the road
(T. 93), it slid diagonally across the highway, where it
finally came to rest with the front end against the guardrail on the west side of the highway (T. 94). At about
the time the truck came to re·st, it w.as struck by the
plaintiff's automobile (T. 95). This testimony of Chapman is also undis.p·uted.
The plaintiff testified that on the afternoon of the
accident, he had been with his boys attending to their
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horses in the northern part of Orem (T. 115). It had
been snowing all afternoon ( T. 115). They were returning to their home, but at about the top of the Orem Hill,
the plaintiff ·decided to drive down the hill to the service
S't.ation to fill his tank with gasoline (T. 118). On direct
examination he testified that he was traveling at about
35 miles per hour two blocks north of the top of the hill,
116), but that he slowed down, although to what
extent he did not know, anticipating that he would turn
off the highway toward his home (T. 117). After he
started down the hill, he never again used the acceler:ator,
( T. 117), and after testing his brakes and finding that
they would not decelerate his car, he shifted down into
second gear to further reduce his speed (T. 118). However, on cross-examination he admitted that according
to his best judgn1ent he \vas traveling 35 miles per hour
.at the top of the hill, ( T. 131), and at a point only 200
feet north of the point of in1pact, he was traveling at
30 miles per hour (T. 132). He 'Yas aware of the danger
of an accident "Then the defendant's truck "~as 50 to 60
feet aw.ay, (T. 1:22), but he 'Yas unable to stop in time
to avoid a collision, and he struck the truck ''~th such
force .and violence that his car bounc.ed back up the hill
six to eight feet (T. 15, 1:28), and both vehicles we.re
da1 HHgPd to the extent of $1200 ( T. 132). That he was
going at a speed of 35 nriles per hour at the top of the
hill 'vaH eorroborated by his son Douglas (T. 153). The

err.

plaintiff a.d1nitted that he had lived in Oren1 for 7 years~
that

1lP

"'a8 thoroughly fanliliar \Yith the Ore1n Hill:

that in pt'riods of adverse ':veather, the hill \Yas usually
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more slipp·ery and difficult than t.he level road; and
that he had reason to anticipate that the hill would be
more slippery than the level ro.ad on the night of the
accident (T. 128).
Mrs. Hartley te~stified that after the accident, the
plaintiff said that he was g·oing too fast for existing conditions (T. 75, 76, 78, 80, 81). He did not deny making
such an admission ( T. 127) .
It is true that officers Levin and Loveless testified,
over obje·ction, that in their opinion, the maximum safe
speed on t·he Orem hill on the evening of the..accident
was 10 to 15 miles per hour, (Levin) (T. 19); or 20 miles
per hour, (I~oveless) (T. 43). We believe that this was
inadmissible opinion ev·idence, since it called for a conclusion on a subject on which laymen are capable of forming valid opinions without the need for expert assistance.
However, both witnesses admitted, on cross-examination,
that they had had no experience in operating a transport
tr~tck and trailer of the kind being operated by Chapman,
and that their opinions were based purely upon their
experience in operating ordinary passenger type vehicles (T. 32, 45). They admitted that they were not
qualified to give an opinion as to wh,a.t would he a safe
speed for a truck and trailer having in mind the difference in weight, traction, controllability, etc. (T. 31, 32,
45, 46). On the other hand, the witness Chapman who
had had considerable experience in the management of
such equipment, (T. 98, 99), testified that in his opinion,
35 miles per hour w.as a safe speed for the truck and
trailer on the evening of the accident, and a safeT speed
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than a les-ser spee·d would have been (T. 105, 111, 112).
He pointed out that at lesser speeds, there would be
dangers of the equipment stalling on the highway, or
"spinning out," which would imperil not only that equipment, but also other traffic on the highway (T. 104, 105,
108). The opinion of Ch;a.pman was the only opinion of a
qualified witness as to the safe speed for the operation
of a tank truck and trailer, and is not disputed or controverted by any admissible evidence.
We particularly wish to note our dissent to the statelnent on page 2 of the appellant's brief, that Denison
/slowed down to about 15 miles per hour as he approached
the crest of the hill. 'V e have searched the reoord in vain
for any testin1ony io support that statement. There is
considerable evidence to the contrary, 'vhich oomes from
\
the n1outh of the plaintiff himself, and his infant son.
·we also disagree with the statement that Chapman was
approxi1nately one foot v~~est of the dividing line between
the two north traffic lanes. The only basis for such a
~tate1nent is the opinion test.nnony of Officer Levin that
the point of intpart "~as one foot 'vest of the dividing line
(~~- :21). But C~hap1nan testified that he ,,~as "right
against" or "over a little bit" fro1n the center line (T.
91). The evidence sho"\Ys '" ithout dispute that :\Irs. Hart1(-l~~ \Vas at all tiines on the extre1ne right hand side of the
road, and that Chapn1an "\vas in the proper lane to pass
the IIartley auto1nobile.

All of the "\vitnesses agreed that at the tune and place
of the accident, the highway was eovered 'vith ice, and
\vas extrem.ely slippery.
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STATEl\fENT OF POINTS TO BE RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT
CHAPMAN ATTEMPTED TO PASS THE HAR.TLEY AUTOMOBILE AT A DISTANCE SO CLOSE THAT THE JURY
WOULD BE JUSTI·FIED IN FINDING HIM GUILTY OF
NEGLIGEN·CE.

)
'

POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT CHAPM4N WAS NOT DRIVING AT
AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF SPEED, AND THE ACCIDENT
WAS NOT CAUSED BY ANY EXCESSIVE SPEED ON THE
PART OF CHAPMAN.

I/'/

POIN1, III.
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAS NO
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS O·F THIS CASE.

~

POINT IV.
IF DEFENDANTS WERE GUIUTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF WAS EQUALLY GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

ARGUl\fENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMEN1,
Plaintiff's argument appears to be predicated upon
a false pre·mise. He apparently proceeds on the erroneous assumptions tha.t bec;ause the accident occurred on
the plaintiff's own right hand side of the road, and that
the defendant's oil truck was at the moment of imp1act
on the wrong side of the road, that as a matter of law
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the plaintiff was free of fault, and that one or more of
the defendants must have been guilty of some actionable
negligence. Neither of these assumptions is well founded.
In at least four decisions of this court, a driver on
the right side of the road has been held guilty of negligence in failing to avoid collision with an automobile on
the wrong side of the road. In Farrell v. Cameron, 98 Ut.
68, 94 Pac. ( 2d), 1068, this court affirmed a finding by
the trial court that the defendant was guilty of negligence, in failing to turn out and avoid the autombile
in which plaintiff was riding, and which was approaching
12 to 15 inches across the center line and on the wrong
side of the road. In Ercanbrack v. Ellison, 134 Pac. (2d)
177, the plaintiff was held guilty of negligence, although
entirely on his own right side of the road, in not slowing
up or stopping to pern1it the defendant's truck to complete the p·assing of another automobile proceeding toward the plaintiff. In ThoH1as c. Sadleir, 162 Pac. (2d)
112, the defendant \vas held liable to a. plaintiff who \Yas
riding as a passenger in an auton1o bile traveling partly
on the ,,·rong side of the road, sinee the defendant failed
to travel in the extre1ne right hand lane, but "Tas traveling
in the lane neare~t the eenter of the high"\\~ay. ..A_nd in

florsley c. Robinsou,

11~

lTt.

~~7,

defendant \Vas held liable to a

186 Pae. (:2d) 592, the

pa~senger

in its bus, for

rn iln rP to avoid striking an auto1nobile \vhich skidded
ont or eontrol on a slippery high\Y"ay, and passed in front
of thP dPfendant's bus.
e i.ted,

Ineidentally~

in the case last

the driver of the en r \Yhir h \Vent out of control, and
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into the pathway of the bus, was exonerated from liability.
'rhe cases above cited leave no room for doubt, that
the 1nere fact that a person is upon his own right hand
side of the highway, does not relieve him from ,all responsibility to be alert for traffic which may cross his
path, and to avoid collision with such traffic when there
is a reasonable opportunity to do so.
Equally fallacious is plaintiff's contention, that because the truck of the defendant came· upon the plaintiff's side of the highway, it must have been negligently
operated. The evidence not only shows without dispute,
but the uniformity of the testimony emphasized, that the
highway at the time and place of the accident was
covered with ice, and was extremely slippery. It is well
settled that the mere fact that ,an automobile skids or
slides on a slippery highway, is not evidence, in and of
itself, of negligence on the part of the opera1tor thereof.
If the automobile was carefully operated, and was caused
to skid through no fault of the operator, but due to the
conditions of the highway beyond his control, then the
operator is not guilty of negligence, .and the accident is
(leemed unavoidable. See 5A Am. Jur. 346, 347, 439,
..Automobiles and High,vay Traffic, Sections 193, and 341.
The same rule has been recognized by this court. In West
v. Standard Fuel Co., 17 Pac. (2d) 292, this court said at
page 294:
"There is no evidence tha.t plaintiff did not
have his automobile under control unless it may
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be said that the fact that his automobile skidded
into the truck is such evidence. Such fact may
not be said to show as a matt'er of law that plaintiff did not have control of his automobile."
See also 3-4 Huddy, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law,
Section 68, P·age 120. The same rule is followed and
numerous cases are cited in support thereof, in the annotations in 58 A.L.R., at page 261, and 113 A.L.R-. 992,
both relied upon by the plaintiff.
So far as the defendants Chapman and Continental
Oil Comp.any are concerned, there is no need for speculation or conjecture, as to the cause of the oil truck skidding out of control. The evidence is undisputed that the
oil truck was proceeding northerly on its own side of the
road, and in the proper lane for passing th~ Hartley
auto1nobile. While thus lawfully proceeding along the
highway, it was struck by the Hartley automobile, which
had n1omentarily skidded out of the control of its operator, and collided forcibly ,,~ith the oil truck, thus forcing
the oil truck out of the control of its driver, Chapman,
and across the high,vay, and into the pathway of the
plaintiff. TheTe is no dispute that the oil truck 'vas
knocked out of control by the Hartley aut.on1obile, and
not by any act on the p.art of its operator.
As we understand the plaintiff's position, he relies
for recovery against the defendants Chapn1an and ContiHPntal Oil Con1pany on t"To grounds: First, that they
atte1npted to pass the Hartle~~ automobile~ at a too close,
or nns.afe distanee: and secondly, that the trurk "Tas
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operated at an excessive rate of speed in view of the conditions then and there existing. We consider these points
8eriatim:

POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT
CHAPMAN ATTEMPTED TO PASS THE HARTLEY AUTOMOBILE AT A DISTANCE SO CLOSE THAT THE JURY
WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN FINDING HIM GUII.ITY OF
NEGLIGEN·CE.

According to the testimony of Mrs. Hartley, she was
proceeding along the extreme right hand edge of the
highway. Her right whe:els nright have been off the hard
surfaced portion of the road and on to the shoulder.
Officer Levin testified that the lanes of traffic were about
12 feet wide, and that the Hartley car was about six
or seven feet wide. This would leave a dist ance of at
least five to six feet bet\veen the left side of the Hartley
car and the line dividing the two north hound lane.s of
traffic. Officer Levin also fixed the point of impact as
one foot west of this dividing line. This would indieate
a clearance distance of at least six to seven feet between
the Hartley ear and the oil truck.
1

The w:Utness Chapman testified th:at he was near the
eenter line of the highway, or as he put it, "right against,
or ... over a little bit" from the center line (1\ 91).
He could not properly have proceeded further to the left
\vithout endange~ring south bound traffic. He also testified that he had "over three feet" or "quite a bit further
than that" of clearance of the Hartley ear ( T. 91).
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It is difficult to conceive how the defendalllt Chapman could have allowed more passing distance. Mrs.
Hartley was on the extreme right hand side of the road,
and he was as near the center as he could properly drive.
Clearly -the accident occurred, not by reason of any fault
on the part of Chap1nan, in allowing insufficient clearance of the Har~tley automobile, but by reason of the
Hartley automobile suddenly going out of control and
into the oil truck.

POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT CHAPMAN WAS NOT DRIVING AT
AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF SPEED, AND THE ACCIDENT
WAS NOT CAUSED BY ANY EXCESSIVE SPEED ON THE
PART OF CHAPMAN.

The argument that the oil truck was proceeding at
an unsafe speed is equally without merit. While the
speed of the truck was established pr.actically without
dispute at about 35 miles per hour at the moment of the
accident, ~there is no competent evidence in the record
that this was not a safe rate of spe·ed for the truck to
travel; and there is the uncontradicted expert testimony
of Chapn1an hilnself, that 35 nriles per hour ''as the
minimun1 s.afe speed at ,,~hich the truck could negotiate
the hill. 'rhe plaintiff relies upon the testhnony of the
two poliee offieers, fixing the n1axin1m11 safe speed at
1G to ~0 1niles per hour. fio,Yever, as "~e pointed out in
our statc1nent of faets, sueh opinions, even if ,adnrissible,
\V<'rP hased purely· upon the officers' experience in operating ordinary passenger type rehicles. Both adn1itted,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
that they had no kno,vledge or experience whatsoeve~r
'vith truck and trailer equip·ment, .and admitted, that such
equipment by reason of its much greater weight, larger
number of \vheels and other differences, might be safely
operated at a greater rate of speed under the conditions
prevailing on the evening of the accident. Chapman, on
the other hand, who qualified .as an expert in handling
of large truck and trailer units, testified that the truck
and trailer could not have been operated up the hill at a
lesser speed than 35 miles per hour without dangeT of
'"spinning out," which would endanger not only that
equipment, but also all 01ther tr.affic on the highway.
Even if a jury rnight find that 35 miles per hour
\Vas an excessive rate of speed under the circumstances,
the evidence is clear, and without dispute, that the collision was not caused by speed, but was caused solely by
the I-Iartley automobile going out of control.and colliding 'vi,th the oil truck. The same result would h·a:ve occurred, if the truck had heen going only 20 miles per hou.r.
POINT III.
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAS NO
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE .

.i\s a sort of last resort, the plaintiff suggests that
he should be entitled to go to the jury under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. It requires no extended argument to
demonstrate that the doctrine has no application to the
facts of this case. It is well settled that in order for tha~t
doctrine to apply, the instrumentality causing the damage n1ust have been under the sole and exclusive control
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of the defendant, and that the accident must have been
of such a nature that it would not ordinarily occur, except as a result of negligent inspection, use or operation.
Laos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., (Ut.), 108 Pac. (2d)
254. Neither element is present in this case. The truck
was not in the exclusive control of Chapman and the
Continental Oil Company. On the contrary, it had been
knocked comp~etely out of their control by the independent, intervening ·act of the defendant llartley.
Nor ean skidding out of control be said to be such
an event as will not ordinarily occur, except as a
result of negligence on the part of the operator of the
vehicle. On the contrary, courts have long and universally recognized that the most carefully operated vehicle may slide from its operator's control on slick and
slippery roads. 5A Am. Jur., 439, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic, Sec. 341 .. The case of Barret v. Caddo
Transfer & Warehouse Conzpany, 165 La. 1075, 116 So.
563, 58 ALR 261, cited and relied upon by the plaintiff,
is ample authority on this point. The court there quoted
with approval fron1 Linden v. Miller. 172 \\. . is. 20, 177
N.W. 909:
"Skidding may occur \Yithout f.ault, and \Yhen
it does occur it n1ay like,vise continue without
fault for a considerable space and time. It 1neans
partial or complete loss of control of the car
under circnn1stances not necessar-ily inlplying
negligence. l-Ienee Pl~aintiff 's elaiJ.n that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the present
situation is not well founded. In order to make
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply, it must be
held that skidding itself in1plies negligence. This
it doe~ not. It -is a 1Cell-knoU'II z1h.1JSical fact that
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ca~rs

may skid on greasy or slippery roads without fault either on acco~tnt of the manner of handling the car, or on account of its being there."
(Emphasis ours.)
As was picturesquely said in L'Ecuyer v. Farnslcorth, 106 Vt. 180, 170 A. 677:
·"The sudden and unexpected skidding of an
automobile is one of the natural hazards of driving cars on icy roads, and it may happen to the
best of oper~ators; and the viatic vagaries of automobiles when skidding on icy roads are as well
known to automobile drivers as thos:e of cows."
Other cases to the same effect are found in the annotation in 58 ALR, commencing at page 269, where it is
said:
"It has been generally held that the mere fact
that an automobile skids on a slippery pavement
does not of itself constitut:e evidence of negligence
upon the driver's part so as to render the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine applicable."
J[ore recent decisions are collected in the annotation
in 113 ALR, commencing at page 1014:
Plaintiff relies upon the recent decision of an interInediate appellrute court of the state of California, Barrera v. deLa1'orre, (Cal. App.), 300 Pac. (2d) 100. We
question the reasoning of the decision, but right or
\Vrong, there were two distinguishing fact elements present in that ease not p~resent here. First, in that case, there
1.vas dispute in the evidence as to whether there had been
an antecedent collision between defendant's vehicle and
a third vehicle which had caused the subsequent collision
'vith plaintiff's building. This is of great importance
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in determining whether defendant had exclusive control.
In the case at bar, the evidence is undisputed, and was
developed by the plaintiff himself, that the oil truck was
knocked out of control by an antecedent collision with
the Hartley automobile, .and wholly without f.ault on the
p~arrt of the operator of the oil truck. Secondly, the California ease did not involve icy slippery roads, such as
were involved in the 0ase at bar. And as above noted,
skidding out of control on icy roads, does not necessarily
bespeak negligence.

POINT I,T.
IF DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF WAS EQUALLY GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

In directing ,a verdict for the defendants, the trial
court took the position that the evidence showed conclusively that the accident \Yas an inevitable or unavoidable
accident, not caused by· the fault of any party to this
action. In other words, the trial court found all of the
p~arties free of negligence. \\.,. e believ-e that tlris holding
is not only supported, but con1pelled, by the evidence.
However, \Ve further contend tl1at if the defendant~ \Yere
negligent in any of the particulars clain1ed by the plaintiff, it 1nust neeessarily followr that tl1e plaintiff "~as guilty
of contributor~? negligence, for the record sho,,~s "ithout
di~putP, that his conduct \Yas of the sa1ne kind and
nature as that of the defendants, and if "~11at the defendants did could be said to be negligence, it 1nust follow·
that \r·hat. the plaintiff did \\~as like,,~ise negligence. If it
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\Vas negligent for this defendant to travel 35 miles per
hour up the hill, it was most certainly negligent for the
plaintiff to tr.avel 30 miles per hour down the hill. The
plaintiff by his own admission had reason to suspect that
the hill would be more icy than the level road, and a car
going down hill is accelerated by gravity, whe~reas a car
going up hill h.as the aid of gravity in stop~ping in the
event of an einergency. Although the plaintiff claims to
have reduced speed between the time he started down
the hill, and the moment of inlp,act, the evidence in this
regard is very vague. However, the evidence is cle,ar that
he appreciated the danger of an accident 50 or 60 feet
before the impact occurred, .and that he was neither able
to stop his automobile within that distance, nor was he
able to reduce its speed appreciably. He struck the truck
with such :force and violence, that both vehicles. were
rla1naged ~to the extent of $1200, and his own car bounced
back up the hill six or eight feet. This was not a light
blow.
I

On p.age 13 of his brief, plaintiff suggests that the
,jury had the right to find that JYirs. Hartley was negligent for even trying to negotiate the hill at the time of
the accident. If this be so, the jury must also necessarily
find that Denison was equally negligent in attempting to
do the sa1ne thing. Contrary to another statement on
p.age 13 of plaintiff's brief, Mrs. Hartley tes,tified without
contradiction or dispute, that she had experienced no
difficulty negotiating the hill until the moment when
she suddenly lost control of her car. Denison, on the
other hand, admjttedly had difficulty all the way down.
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He first atte1npted to apply brakes, and found that had
no effect whatsoever. He then shifted into seeond gear,
and finally as a last resort cut off the ignition. All of
this faile~d to avoid the accident.
CONCLUSION
Like counsel for the plaintiff, we have been unable
to locate :any cases so closely similar in point of fact,
.as might be said to be controlling or determinative of the
case at bar. However, the general principles governing
this cas~e, are well settled. There is no evidence from
which a jury might properly find that the defendants
Chapman and Continental Oil Company failed to allow
sufficient cle~arance in p.assing the Hartley ear, nor is
there evidenee to show ·excessive speed on the part of
these defendants, or that speed on the part of these defendants caused or contributed to cause the accident.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application to
the facts of this case. The plaintiff "\Yas guilty of the
s.ame kind of conduct of which he complains on the part
of the defendants. Either the accident was an unavoidable accident, not eause·d by the negligence of any party,
as held by the trial court, or else the plaintiff 'Yas guilty
of eontributory negligence, and as such, "\Yas equally
.culpable for his O"\vn loss, .and therefore, not entitled to
recover. In either event, the judgment of the trial court
is correct, and should be affirn1ed.
Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN &

~CHRISTENSEN

Attorneys for defendants and respondents
Continental Oil Company and Chapman

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

